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INTERVENTIONISTS OFTEN COMPLAIN THAT A policy of 
nonintervention means doing nothing. And in the face of so 
much human suffering, surely that's unacceptable. Surely, we 
simply can't stand by idly? We've got to do something. 
I agree, of course, that the kind of suffering that is going on 
in our world is unacceptable. (Every decent person does.) But 
that's really not the question. The question is-what the morally 
right response is to this unacceptable state of affairs. Or at least, 
that should be the question. 
In most discussions, humanitarianism and noninterven-
tion are posited as opposites. Nonintervention, we're told, 
means supporting sovereignty, self-determination, statism, 
the legalist paradigm, a Hegelian Myth, or what have you. 
Humanitarianism, we're told, represents a care for the lives, 
freedoms, and rights of individuals. And humanitarianism, of 
course, means intervention. 
But this is an imaginary opposition. Most of the time, the 
truly humanitarian thing to do, the thing that really respects 
human life, is to refrain from using military force. Most of the 
time, interventions are simply too risky, imperiling innocent 
life, to count as genuinely humanitari~n. · 
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A DUTY TO INTERVENE? 
One might go beyond merely saying that we ou~ht to re?ect 
life, of course. Often, supporters of expanded mtervent1on-
ism assert a duty to protect life as well. They assert that there a 
moral duty to intervene in case of crisis.1 • . 
I say ((assert" rather than "argue," because t~e claim 1s 
rarely backed up. One way one might try to bac~ 1t up ':ould 
be to invoke an argument by Peter Singer. Accordmg to Smger, 
there is a general moral duty to help those in need. In~eed, 
most of us are already committed to this idea, Singer thmks. 
Of course, Singer's discussion concerns humanitarian aid and 
redistribution, not military intervention, but his arguments are 
easily extended that way. 
Consider the following application of Singer's argument: 
1. Suffering, and death from a lack of food, shelter, and 
medical care are morally bad. 
2. 1he Singer Principle (Weak Version): If it is in our power 
to prevent something bad from happening, without 
thereby sacrificing anything of moral significance, we 
ought, morally, to do it. 2 - • 
3. The Empirical Claim: We can prevent suffenng and 
death by supporting foreign military interventions. 
4. Therefore, we ought, morally, to support military 
interventions. 
1. See, among- others, Oberman, "Toe Myth of the Optional ~ar: 
Why States Are Required to Wage the Wars They Are Permitted · 
to Wage." 
2. Peter Singer, ((Famine, Afiluence, and Morality," Philosophy and 
Public Affairs I (1973): 229-243, 231. Note that this reflects the 
weaker of two principles Singer discusses. 
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Note the neat separation of facts and principles. Morality 
demands that we help those in need. How we help is an empir-
ical question. The two are different issues, and one does not 
affect the other. 
Most people who find Singer's principles plausible find 
them plausible because of a famous thought experiment: 
One Drowning Child 
Suppose you are walking past a shallow pond and see a 
child drowning in it. You can wade in and pull the child 
out, even though this means getting your clothes muddy. 
But this is insignificant compared to the death of the 
child. 3 
To Singer, this thought experiment illustrates the application 
of the more gerieral principle just given. The only difference 
between One Drowning Child and the case of intervention is 
the empirical part. What is the same is a general moral duty to 
help those in need. 
I agree, of course, that you ought to wade in and help the 
child in One Drowning Child. But this does not mean accept-
ing Singer's general principle. For while it is true that there are 
important empirical differences between One Drowning Child 
and the circumstances of intervention, it's false to think the 
differences in the one case do not affect the other case. 
Consider the following variation of One Drowning Child, 
offered by David Schmidtz: 
One Drowning Child-II 
A baby is drowning in the pool beside you. You can save 
the baby by a process that involves giving the thug who 
threw the baby in the pool a hundred dollars. If you do not 
save the baby, the baby will die. You save the baby. A crowd 
3. Ibid., 231. 
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begins to gather, including several more thugs .-~1i-';,,-ti1i,w•,; .. 
more babies. Seeing what you have done, the thugs 
a few more babies into the pool. The babies will drown 
unless you give each of the thugs a hundred dollars. More 
thugs begin to gather, carrying even more babies, waiting 
to see what you do.4 
Schmidtz's point is not that this alternative thought experiment 
better reflects the world we live in. Nor is his point that helping 
people will immediately turn our world into this. Rather, the 
point is that the actions we choose will have consequences, and 
those consequences matter. Or, more precisely, the principles we 
choose will have consequences, and those consequences matter-
including for what principles are acceptable in the first place. 
A duty to intervene is a standing principle to inter-
vene whenever we can alleviate need. We don't need thought 
experiments to know the consequences this might this have. 
During the late 1990s Kosovo crisis, the Kosovo Liberation 
Army (KLA) sought independence from Serbia. 5 The Albanian 
minority in Kosovo had long been discriminated against by the 
Serbian authorities. In 1991, the Democratic League of Kosovo, 
under leadership of Ibrahim Rugova, organized a referendum 
in which an overwhelming majority of voters supported inde-
pendence from Serbia. Rugova proposed a tactic of peaceful 
negotiation with Serbia in order to work toward secession out 
of fear for a Serbian backlash against the Albanians. 
When Rugova's peaceful strategy failed to mobilize inter-
national support for Kosovar independence, more radical 
4. David Schmidtz, "Separateness, Suffering, and Moral Theory," in 
his Person, Polis, Planet (Oxford University Press, 2008), 148-149. 
5. The discussion here follows Wheeler, Saving Strangers, 257ff. 
and the references therein. See also Seybolt, Humanitarian 
Intervention, 81. 
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groups came to prominence, including the KLA, which openly 
advocated the use of violent means. Because the KLA lacked 
popular support and was weak compared to the Serbian 
authorities, they settled on a strategy of deliberately provok-
ing Serbian police and Interior Ministry attacks on Albanian 
civilians. Their aim was to increase civilian casualties in order 
to draw international attention and support, and eventually a 
military intervention. As Dugi Gorani, a Kosovar Albanian 
negotiator, said: "Every single Albanian realized that the more 
civilians die, intervention comes nearer."6 
During February 1996, the KLA started a campaign ofbomb-
ing against Serb targets, which lasted until 1998, when Serbian 
forces attacked the KLA with heavy weapons and air support. 
The Serb forces burned villages and drove hundreds and thou-
sands of Kosovars from their homes. These attacks were quickly 
condemned by the Clinton administration. U.S. Secretary of State 
Madeleine Albright stated in March 1998 that "we believe that 
in 1991 the international community stood by and watched eth-
nic cleansing [in Bosnia] .... We don't want that to happen again 
this time."7 The message was clear: this administration would not 
allow the human rights of Kosovars to go violated like this again. 
The violence continued, leading to the NATO campaign's 
Allied Force. Once the campaign commenced, Serbian forces 
6. A. Little, "Moral Combat: NATO at War," BBC 2 Special, March 12, 
2000, transcript at http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/static/events/ 
panorama/transcripts/transcript_l2_03_00.txt. Hashim Thad, a 
KLA leader, openly admitted that "any armed action we under-
took would bring retaliation against civilians. We knew we were 
endangering a great number of civilian lives." See also discussion 
in Seybolt, Humanitarian Intervention; and Hehir, Humanitarian 
Intervention After Kosovo, 111. 
7. Cited in Wheeler, Saving Strangers, 258, following J. Steele, 
"Learning to Live with Milosevic," Transitions 5 (1998): 19. 
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intensified their assault on the ethnically Albanian population 
in Kosovo, with significant casualties, large numbers of refu-
gees, and thousands of additional civilian deaths as_a result.3 
Singer might object that none of this impugns his proposed 
moral principle. But that would be to miss the point of One 
Drowning Child-IL If a proposed moral duty of intervention 
encourages thugs to sacrifice innocent lives so as to promote 
their political agendas, that fact counts against the proposed 
moral duty. The duties of help that we end up endorsing, if we 
do end up endorsing them, better actually help the people who 
need it the most.9 
Singer seems to think that if we accept that there is a duty 
to save the child in One Drowning Child, then we must also 
accept a duty to save the child in One Drowning Child-II. And, 
by extension, we must accept the duty in cases of intervention. 
Indeed, Singer thinks we have a duty to assist anyone around 
the world who needs our assistance, even if this means bring-
ing down our own living standards by a lot. (Possibly to the 
8. See Seybolt, Humanitarian Intervention, 82. See also A_lan_ T. 
Kuperman, "Mitigating the Moral Hazard of Humamtanan 
Intervention: Lessons from Economics," Global Governance 14 
(2008): 219-240, offering additional evidence about Kosovo and 
similar dynamics more recently in Sudan. 
9. It's worth noting that, in earlier cases, the international commu~-
ity has been quite sensitive to this issue. For example, during t e 
imposition of a no-fly zone in northern Iraq, it was made quite 
clear that independence for the Kurds was off the table, since as 
Wheeler puts it, "any proposal along these lines would have sent 
shock waves through those governments in the region that had 
large Kurdish minorities. Moreover, legitimating secession would 
have established a dangerous precedent that would have placed at 
risk the constitutive rules of sovereignty, non-intervention, and 
territorial integrity in the society of states." See Wheeler, Saving 
Strangers, 158. 
2 6 8 j HUMANITARIAN NONINTERVENTION 
point where the marginal disutility of giving help is greater 
than the marginal utility of the help itself.) 
But note that this is an additional claim. And it's one that 
doesn't follow from saying that there is a duty to save the child 
in One Drowning Child. It's a risky claim, too. After all, if we 
cannot choose between saving the child in One Drowning 
Child and saving all the vulnerable people in the world, we will 
be forced to choose between having to save everyone and hav-
ing to save no one. And in that case, we may be forced to choose 
no one. That would be an even greater tragedy. 
PEOPLE AND PLACES 
If interventionism. isn't humanitarian, that doesn't mean any 
kind of nonintervention is humanitarian. No policy exists in a 
vacuum, and what we surround it with matters. Humanitarian 
nonintervention has to be made that way. 
The aim of the interventionist is to bring peace and stabil-
ity to places where people are forced to live under conditions 
of oppression, conflict, and war. But there are two variables 
to this equation: the people and the places in which they live. 
Unfortunately, the quality of the institutions that govern places 
is highly inert. Bad institutions incentivize political and social 
elites to keep them bad. Their extractive ways of life depend on 
it. And there isn't much that we as outsiders can do about it 
Fortunately, the people living in these places are not so 
inert. They can and often are willing to move. And we, as out-
siders, can make it much easier for them to do so. The truly 
humanitarian response to suffering and oppression around the 
world, then, is not to try and fix other countries through the 
use of violence. The truly humanitarian response is to make 
it as easy as possible for those who are forced to live in these · 
countries to leave for better places. 
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Unfortunately, in our world, few people have the oppor-
tunity to improve their lives in this way. Every safe and pros-
perous country in our world tries its best to keep immigrants 
out. They put up fences and walls, and post them with armed 
guards. They patrol their coastal waters, monitor airports, and 
so on. Millions who nevertheless see themselves forced to flee 
their homes in places like Syria, Iraq, and Sudan end up spend-
ing years in camps, in legal limbo while their asylum applica-
tions are pending, and so on. 
A policy of humanitarian nonintervention is not a policy 
of maintaining the status quo. It requires significant and deep 
changes to politics as usual. But this does not tell in favor of 
more intervention. After all, intervention is politics as usual. 
The fact that this has not reduced conflict, disorder, and misery 
around the world is no reason for wanting more of it. Quite the 
·opposite. 
The real tragedy is the combination of this impermissible 
stance on intervention with the also impermissible position of 
keeping immigrants out. Indeed, I find it difficult to think of a 
more atrocious combination of policies than, on the one hand, 
an overly interventionist foreign policy, exporting violence in 
order to silence our conscience while on the other hand, doing 
one's best to trap the victims of this violence where it hurts the 
most.10 
10. Of course, there is just as much political opposition to freer 
immigration as to long-lasting nation-building. However, and 
contrary to intervention, immigration does have a history of suc-
cess. So, while I see no reason to think that governments will 
become willing to support long-lasting foreign nation-building, 
the prospects for more open immigration policies may be better. 
